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Introduction 
In the last few years there has been an explosive increase in our knowledge of  the molec- 
ular biology of  myxoviruses. Some of  this information has been used to formulate new 
hypotheses concerning the epidemiology of  myxovirus infections. For acceptance, epi- 
demiologic hypotheses, like others, must provide satisfactory explanations for all of 
the known findings - not for just a convenient subset of  them. The following mys- 
teries present formidable challenges to current formulations. 
Recycling of  Influenza A Antigens 
It is generally accepted that results of  seroepidemiologic investigations have identified 
3 past periods of prevalence in man of  antigens, which characterize 3 different families 
of  Influenza A strains. Table 1 presents these serologic recapitulations and illustrates 
the phenomenon of  antigenic recycling. Asian-like viruses were prevalent from 1889 
through 1901, Hong Kong-like strains from 1902 through 1917 and swine-like viruses 
from 1918 through 1928. The timing shown is validated by a host of  reports [3]. In 
Table 1. Periods of past prevalences of influenza a viruses of epidemiological importance in man 
Prototype virus Prevalence years 
A2/Japan/305/57-1ike 1890-1901 
A3/Hong Kong/1/68-1ike 1902--1917 




A3/Hong Kong/l/68 1968- 
A/New Jersey/8~76 1976- 
*Dedicated to Professor Werner Schiller on the occasion of his 65 th birthday 
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Age in y e a r s  
1957 there was a resurgence of Asian strains, in 1968 of Hong Kong hemagglutinins 
and in 1976 swine virus reappeared in focal epidemic form in the United States. How 
can this remarkable recycling of influenza virus antigens be explained? Clearly one 
requirement is availability of a susceptable population among whom the appropriate 
viruses can circulate. Figure 1 presents schematically age specific distributions of pro- 
totype antibodies found globally in the sera of humans. The time frame of reference 
is 1976. Antibody to swine virus using either Shope's classic or the current A/New 
Jersey~8~76 strain, is uncommonly found before the age of 50. Antibody to HON1 
strains like A/PR/8/34 is seldom present before age 35, to H1N1 strains like A/FM/1/47, 
before age 25, and to H2N2 strains like A/Japan/305/57, before the age of 10. In con- 
trast, the youngest cohort of the population is currently relatively saturated with H3N2 
antibody. 
Resistance to infection with influenza viruses correlates with serum antibody levels 
and resistance of the school aged population acquired either by repeated natural in- 
fection or by vaccination is certainly one of the forces that blunts epidemic impacts 
and helps to curtail circulation of virus [5, 10, 15]. If antibody saturation of the 
9 population is a factor which limits epidemicity, it follows that an antibody void would 
favor viral spread. The dotted lines on the right hand side of the H3N2 and H2N2 
antibody patterns mark the present age of members of the older cohorts whose pre- 
epidemic antibody patterns in 1957 and 1968 identified them as persons who first 
experienced antigens common to the Asian and Hong Kong subtypes in the course of 
their childhood infections which took place in the years 1889 to 1901 and 1902 to 
Reflections on the Epidemiology of Myxovirus Infections 71 
1917 respectively [17, 14]. In 1957, before recycling of the Asian strains, and in 1968 
before the H3 antigen reappeared, the sera of persons less than 70 years of age were 
virtually devoid of corresponding antibody, This circumstance was a clear indication 
of the ~rulnerability of those subjects and the intense pandemics which followed re- 
surgence of these viruses bore sharp witness to the validity of the association between 
antibody voids and epidemic likelihoods. The gap in swine antibody to age 50 in 1976 
clearly favored reemergence of viruses with swine-like antigens, although up to the pre- 
sent, the A/New Jersey/76 strains have exhibited only a limited capability for spread. 
It is evident that characteristics of the parasite are as important as those of the host 
in determining the outcome of revisitations. While to date the order of reappearance 
of antigenii: subtypes is that of the original succession, the course of antigenic recycling 
may not necessarily be circular. Antibody gaps to PR8-1ike strains until age 35 and 
and to FMI-like stains until age 25 provide ample opportunities for viral spread inde- 
pendent of the order in which viruses with similar antigenic characteristics might re- 
appear. 
A second requirement for recycling of influenza antigens is that the appropriate vi- 
ruses be available to invade the gaps at the appropriate times. Where do the viruses 
come from? There is a moderate consensus on the origin of interpandemic strains, 
but not on that of pandemic viruses. The former exhibit modest antigenic change, 
i.e., drift, the latter major change, i.e., shift. Different mechanisms have been evoked 
to account for the changes found within a family of strains from those that are ob- 
served between families of strains. 
Origin of lnterpandemic Strains 
It is commonly believed that interpandemic antigenic drift is mediated by selection of 
spontaneous mutants through immune pressures generated by antigenic saturation of 
a population highly exposed to recently prevalent strains. The Archetti-Horsfall ex- 
periment and antibody profiles are cited as supporting evidence [1, 9]. Since influenza 
viruses are in continuous circulation through the population, though at very low levels 
of activity in interepidemic periods, there is no need to invoke in this model extra hu- 
man sources for the virus of the next outbreak [22, 16]. At first glance, this construct 
seems quite satisfactory, yet upon reflection, it becomes apparent that something is 
amiss. One would ordinarily expect to encounter mutation during the period when 
the largest number of replication cycles are occurring, i.e., in the course of epidemics. 
In point of fact virus isolates are monotonously uniform antigenically throughout 
epidemic and pandemic prevalences. Antigenic change actually takes place between, 
not during, epidemics and occurs as an event associated with low levels of transmission 
when relatively few cycles of replication are in progress. 
Why the anlage for antigenic drift develops during interepidemic periods remains 
a mystery. Environmentally-induced host modifications that favor selection of variants 
may play the determining role. The phenomenon involved may not be unlike those 
operative in adaptation of influenza viruses to growth at low temperatures or in the 
presence of antimetabolites. In both cases antigenic drifting has been observed [13]. 
Detailed genetic study of these models might shed some light upon what is really going 
on in man. Equally remarkable is the fact that interpandemie, as well as formerly 
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pandemic strains, disappear without exhausting the pool of susceptibles. Francis at- 
tributed this phenomenon to interference by new rapidly disseminating strains, which 
pre-empt the susceptible niches [9]. The existence of host resistance must play some 
role in the phenomenon of viral replacement [22]. However, why the 'new' virus al- 
ways gets to the niche first is far from clear. 
Origin of Pandemic Strains 
There is far less concordance concerning concepts of the origin of pandemic strains. 
As early as 1695, Molineux proposed that equine influenza virus might be involved in 
human pandemics [14]. Traditional views have considered man as the source of pan- 
demic as well as of interpandemic strains. The processes involved were thought to be 
the same, but the degree of change was recognized as greater. Mulder hypothesized 
that the pandemic Asian strain of 1957 erupted from a swine reservoir in China, where 
it had been maintained since its prior visitation in the 1889-90 pandemic [17]. Recent- 
ly, with broader recognition of antigenic relationships between avian and human isolates 
of Influenza A, first disclosed by Prof. W. Sch/ifer 22 years ago [19] the thesis has been 
developed that wild birds may constitute the true reservoir of the antigens of pandemic 
viruses. The unresolved question is: Does an extra human reservoir for pandemic; 
strains exist and if so, where is it? My thesis is that epidemiologic observations provede 
some guidelines for the framework in which the answers must eventually fit. 
The horse is the easiest to set aside. One cannot help but be impressed by the fact 
that despite heavy exposure to Equine 1 or Equine 2 strains not a single equestrian 
has acquired infection during the recurrent epizootics. While it is true that Hong Kong 
(H3N2) viruses share the hemagglutinin of Equine 2 strains, the neuraminidase is 
clearly different [6]. The pig is not so easily dismissed. Serologic data indicate that 
swine producers, veterinarians and slaugther house workers have infrequently experienced 
occupation related infection with swine influenza viruses [20]. Familial spread was 
not seen. Since 1974, there have been several instances in which illness associated with 
swine virus recovery has been reported [7, 21]. Laboratory evidence of concurrent in- 
fection in the pigs to which the patients had been exposed was obtained. At Fort Dix, 
where over 500 cases occurred within a few weeks, it was not possible to incriminate 
exposure to swine and the supposition was that an incoming recruit, exposed to pigs 
prior to induction into the military, served as the importer [24]. 
While these experiments establish that ~poradic cases and even focal outbreaks of 
swine virus disease can occur in the United States, they do not identify swine as a 
highly probable source of pandemic viruses. Despite the large swine antibody gap in 
humans globally, the swine viruses of 1974, 1975, and 1976 remained sharply focal 
in distribution. In like vein, but in the opposite direction, while the Hong Kong virus 
of the H3N2 family of strains has caused infection in swine herds, it has not replaced 
swine influenza viruses in the United States as the common epizootic agent [8]. Ap- 
parently the 'spill overs' that occur do not possess a high level of competence for 
transmission in the unnatural host. Transmission between man and swine resembles 
a one-way street rather than a fourqane highway. 
Now for the birds. The spectrum of H and N antigens found to date in domestic 
and wild species is dazzling. Provokingly closely related HO, H1, H2, N1 and N2 
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antigens have been found in a small number of bird viruses. The antigen of the human 
strain is generally paired with an avian partner. In all but one case, a Hong Kong isolate, 
antigenic identity with viruses of human origin has not been observed, a finding which 
speaks against birds being a readily accessible reservoir of infection for man. Likewise, 
failure to observe transmission to man of the avian viruses involved in epizootics of 
chickens, quails and turkeys, despite many such opportunities, is incompatible with 
serious consideration of birds as direct reservoirs of human infection. A true avian virus 
antibody pattern has not been found in human sera. 
To circumvent obstacles posed by negative evidence on transspecies transmission, the 
potential of the phenomenon of recombination has been invoked. Since in the laboratory 
one can produce by recombination a strain with almost anything one could want a 
virus to have, why shouldn't this take place in nature? Rasmussen suggested in 1964 
that avian viruses might acquire through recombination properties which wou!.~ assure 
their success as parasites [18]. Webster, Laver, and Beverage have written extensivley on 
the same theme [2,23]. Laver and Webster want to borrow the hemagglutinin HAV7 
from the A/duck/Ukraine/I/63 virus to make Hong Kong H3N2 strains. They allow the 
duck virus to keep its NEq2neuraminidase [1217 Kilbourne borrows more heavily. He 
takes both the H and N antigens from the swine strains and endows them with parts of 
some or all of the other 6 genes of Influenza A viruses that makes them suitable for growth 
in man [11]. Free license for pirating desirable viral properties is one attribute that 
makes molecular epidemiology so beguiling. 
The recombinant hypothesis has been widely popularized. Yet, there are disquieting 
considerations. In the models used to date, recombination takes place at a much higher 
multiplicity of infection with both donor strains than it is reasonable to expect to 
encounter in nature. The recombinants derived comprise a miniscule proportion of the 
yield of  infection and without the application of selective pressures, are rapidly lost on 
passage. Cleary it is unreasonable to assume that high levels of antibody homologous 
to the unwanted parent and capable of screening it out will be available in the naturally 
infected host. If this were the case, that host would not have become infected in the first 
place. Alternatively, a recombinant might in one step lose capacity to grow in one host 
species and gain it for another, thereby eliminating dependency upon an antibody screen. 
In practice, models of transfer of growth potential of recombinants in brains or lungs of 
mice demonstrate that generally such recombinants exhibit lesser vigor than does the 
adapted parent. Recombinants with transspecies potential would tend to behave as 
puny parasites incapable of  competing successfully with their wild parents. Still other 
considerations dampen enthusiasm for either direct escape from an animal or avian 
reservoir or rescue therefrom by recombination. Why do the same antigens escape 
in cyclic sequence and why haven't we seen the other horse or the 7 other bird families of 
strains? Further, is it logical to expect that a parasite like Influenza A could survive 
from at least the twelfth century if it were dependent upon such a tenuous mechanism 
as transspecies periodic crossovers with or without reassortment of genes? Theobald 
Smith would have said No! as would most statisticians. While mutation of influenza 
viruses is known to occur commonly, recombination and/or transspecies infection 
would be expected to be rare events. If survival of the influenza parasite since 1173 
were dependent upon a sequential series of rare resercoir overflows or gene exchanges 
between viruses native to different host species, the probability of survival of influenza 
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would be the product, not the sum, of the likelihood of each and every event happening. 
The p value of such number would be of staggering proportions. 
For the sake of completeness, the classic concept is reconsidered and updated. The 
number of antigenic configurations of influenza viruses is clearly finite. The antigens of 
avian strains are constrained to 8 subtypes, those of man to 4, those of horses to 2 and 
those of swine to 1. The finite limitations are imposed by the necessity that hemagglutinim 
and neuraminidases must undergo assembly to form a functioning envelope. Consequently 
the occurrence of similar configurations on strains isolated from different species may 
merely reflect the repetition of a successful adaptive surival mechanism rather than 
constitute evidence for recent or remote genetic interaction [4]. Continuity of parasitism 
is favored by maintaining the chain of infection in that species to which they are best 
adapted - i.e., man. Antigenic shift and drift occur by mutation and, with the same 
reservations mentioned in considering the other hypothesis, selection is effected by immune 
barriers. Recycling of antigens is inevitable because the genes of influenza viruses 
can code for only a limited number of viable reassortments. The forces operative in 
Influenza A strains are probably operative in Influenza B strains as well. It seems far too 
early to conclude that Influenza B viruses can't shift. All we really know is that they 
haven't yet. Note that the Taiwan strain of 1962 almost made it. The absence of 
Influenza B stains from animal and avian species indicates that this parasite does not re- 
quire a reservoir for survival in man. Why then are we compelled to believe that the 
Influenza A infections of birds, horses and pigs are essential for the survival of that para- 
site in humans. Viruses as similar as Influenza A and B might be expected to exhibit 
similar patterns of parasitism. Some molecular biologists accept drift as the result of a 
small change on the hemagglutinin gene, but are uncomfortable about the large change 
that would have to take place to explain shift. Perhaps this large change comes about 
by a more drastic rearrangement of RNA components on the same gene than heretofore 
envisioned or even by exchanges of RNA components from other genes. Reassortrnent 
then would take place in the absence of donors of foreign information. The complexities 
of RNA replication would tend to favor, not prohibit, large changes happening. 
It is evident that today we cannot make a final choice of the hypothesis, which 
provides irrefutable explanations for all of  the relevant findings, but can only indicate 
current preferences. Optomistically the results of further study will reconcile our present 
selections. 
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